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This paper examines perceptions of corruption in Croatia, its negative impacts to 
the development and anti-corruption measures in the context of the future 
accession of Croatia to the European Union. The main hypothesis of this paper is 
that there are high perceptions of corruption in Croatia, which is an obstacle to 
socio-economic development. Seizing corruption is a necessary criterion for the 
Croatian membership in the European Union, and the lack of effective 
implementation of anti-corruption policy measures makes the existing anti-
corruption policy still inefficient. The corruption prevalence in Croatia is analysed 
from three different viewpoints. The first one examines international ranking of 
Croatia as a relatively highly corrupt country. This is followed by the analysis of 
recent survey results investigating the corruption perceptions of citizens. The third 
aspect considers the corruption perceptions of entrepreneurs in Croatia. Related 
findings point out the sectors and forms of highest corruption prevalence and the 
significance of corruption as an obstacle to the development of entrepreneurship. 
The comparison of the adopted anti-corruption measures with the EU 
recommendations indicates that their implementation requires more intense and 
continuous efforts, with political commitment being the essential factor of success. 
The anti-corruption policy recommendations emphasise the importance of seizing 
corruption for the general benefit of Croatia, and not only in the context of the 
future membership in the European Union. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Corruption is nowadays a widely discussed phenomenon, which, until recently, 
was on the very verge of economic research. Globalisation and raising awareness of 
negative impacts of corruption on socio-economic development have contributed 
to greater research and public interest on the problems of corruption. Seizing 
corruption in Croatia is a political criterion which needs to be fulfilled for 
membership in the European Union, but also a necessary prerequisite of economic 
welfare and social progress. 
 
Until 1990s, there were very few empirical studies of the impacts of corruption on 
economic and social development. This was primarily due to a lack of systematised 
data on the corruption prevalence. Nowadays, international organisations develop 
and publish the corruption perceptions indicators for most of the countries in the 
world. The availability of data enables benchmarking of country position according 
to the perceived corruption prevalence. The most frequently used corruption 
perceptions indicators are the Control of Corruption of the World Bank
1
 and the 
Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International.
2
 Although the 
corruption perceptions indicators are subjective measures based on a surveyed 
prevalence of corruption as it is perceived, for the time being they are the only 
methodologically consistent databases for an analysis of corruption. For Croatia 
and other countries included in the international integration processes, 
international ranking according to corruption perceptions indicators reflects an 
external image of how the country is seen by the international community, 
political partners, business analysts and foreign investors.  
 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that there is a high perception of corruption 
in Croatia, which is an obstacle to socio-economic development. While seizing 
corruption stands as the required pre-condition for Croatia’s EU accession, combat 
                                                 
1 Control of Corruption is one of the six indicators of good governance published by the World Bank for all 
countries in the world every two years. Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/index.html 
2 Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, is published on an annual basis by Transparency International 
organisation for a large number of countries world-wide (CPI for 2005 was published for 159 countries). 
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi 
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against corruption lacks an efficient implementation of anti-corruption policy 
measures. 
 
The paper will primarily address the question what corruption actually is and why 
it is important to raise the awareness of corruption as a serious impediment to 
development. The next chapter deals with the issue of high corruption perceptions 
in Croatia using corruption perceptions indicators. The relative position of 
Croatia in comparison with other countries will be assessed. Furthermore, 
corruption in Croatia will be described by the results of empirical research of the 
perceptions of corruption among citizens and entrepreneurs. 
 
The paper provides a brief review of the requirements of the European Union in 
the accession process, according to which seizing corruption is one of the priorities 
to fulfil the political criteria for Croatia’s EU accession. A comparative analysis 
will examine the compliance of the adopted anti-corruption policy measures with 
the requirements of the European Union and international organisations, and a 
harmonisation of legislative framework for sanctioning corruption activities as 
criminal offences. It also assesses the problems in the implementation. The final 
part of the paper summarises the characteristics of corruption in Croatia and 
derives the anti-corruption policy recommendations. 
 
 
2  Why Is Corruption a Problem? 
 
Corruption has existed throughout the history to date. It is immanent to all states, 
regardless of the political system, regional or religious affiliation. It is impossible 
to eradicate corruption completely, but it can be seized by political will, legal 
norms and promoting anti-corruption awareness (Caiden, 1988). Corruption is a 
hidden phenomenon, so the prevalence of corruption cannot be measured 
precisely, and neither does exist a unique notion of what corruptive acts are.
3
 An 
                                                 
3 Harmonisation of the treatment of corruption as a criminal offence in legislations of specific countries is a 
goal of international convention whose signatories include Croatia. 
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additional problem is an unequal treatment of the corruption deals and legality of 




In the widest sense, corruption is every abuse of rights or authority over the means 
or rights of others for personal profit or personal gain (Burak et al., 1999), and it 
can be present in both the public and the private sectors. Today, the most widely 
used definition considers corruption as “the abuse of public office for private 
gain” (the World Bank, 1997). Accordingly, the corruption always involves the 
public sector, notwithstanding if corruption occurs within the public sector itself 
(for private gain of its employees) or if corrupt transactions occur between the 
public and private sectors. 
 
The basic characteristic of corruption is that it arises from public authority and its 
discretionary power in decision-making. The most frequently distinguished types 
are political and administrative corruption. Political corruption is present among 
high government officials and politicians who are authorised to make political 
decisions, or who are entrusted with high powers which also result in a high 
responsibility for representing the public interest in discharge of duty. This is 
grand corruption, as opposed to administrative or bureaucratic corruption (petty 
corruption), which pertains to public administration employees responsible for the 
enforcement of decisions, regulations, and policy measures (Amundsen, 1999). 
 
 
2.1 Political and Administrative Corruption Go “Hand in Hand” 
 
The forms of political corruption are embezzlement in the political system of a 
country by political candidates and politicians, non-transparency of money flows 
in politics, enabling the private sector to buy political influence, corruption in 
electoral procedure, influence on the national judiciary to process inefficiently, 
and thus protect, criminal offences of corruption, influence on the legislative 
authority to legalise a preferential treatment for specific vested interests. 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, lobbying is a lawful profession in the USA. 
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Political corruption usually starts with non-transparent financing of political 
parties or their campaigns. A lack of public information about real sources of 
financing enables, among other things, for financing from private funds to 
influence political results (Walecki, 2004).  
 
Not all forms of political corruption are illegal in all countries in the world. It is, 
therefore, important to harmonise the legislative framework on the international 
level for the purpose of combating political corruption. In the annual proceedings 
Global Corruption Report 2004, Transparency International focuses on the problem 
of a growing presence of political corruption and its increasingly stronger 
influence on formulating and characteristics of policy measures world-wide. 
Political corruption is a threat to democracy. The negative allocation of resources 
is performed through getting around the institutions and the legal system by those 
whose particular responsibility is to establish and preserve the rule of law. 
 
The presence of political corruption is usually accompanied by a wide-spread 
administrative corruption. Public administration employees have far lower 
authorities than officials and politicians. However, their discretionary power in the 
implementation of policy measures enables them private rent-seeking in the form 
of bribes or counter-favours obtained for services in the competence of public 
administration. Thus, public administration employees deprive the citizens of a 
guaranteed right to use public services pursuant to regulations equally valid for all 
citizens (Situngkir, 2004). The most frequent forms of administrative corruption 
are those when a public administration employee, for a bribe or an obtained 
counter-favour issues permits and certificates in contravention with regulations (by 
not abiding by criteria or not meeting the deadlines), enables a preferential 
treatment in the provision of public services, or enables avoiding sanctions or tax 
evasion. Administrative corruption is of a smaller scale than political corruption 
and is relatively more easily suppressed by enhanced internal control and an 
appropriate organisation of public services. 
 
Croatian term “bribe and corruption” indicates that corruption, in addition to the 
bribery, implies other less known forms of corruptive behaviour. The most 
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frequent ones are embezzlement, theft, fraud and extortion, nepotism and 
cronyism, influence peddling, patronage and lobbying. 
 
 
2.2 Negative Impacts of Corruption 
 
Modern theories and empirical research agree upon negative impacts of 
corruption.
5
 Corruption acts as an arbitrary tax which increases costs and disrupts 
an efficient allocation of resources and fair distribution of income. Corruption 
increases income inequality and poverty. Corruption revenues are collected by the 
minority which becomes disproportionately richer, whereas vulnerable groups of 
population have too weak purchasing power to pay bribes (Hassan, 2004).  
 
Corruption affects mostly the public sector, directly decreasing state revenues and 
leading to a number of indirect, but extremely harmful consequences. Those are 
primarily reduced financing left for education, health and social welfare, and for 
infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Corruption in the public sector is 
manifested in higher expenditures required for state investments, since it makes 
public procurement and contracts for the construction and maintenance of 
infrastructure more expensive, primarily transport infrastructure. Given that 
corruption activities are performed in high secrecy, corruption makes it easy to 
change the priorities in public investments from the projects aimed at 
improvement of education and health to the projects targeting financing of 
defence or infrastructure, which are by nature less under public scrutiny (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993). If economic policy makers are corrupted, the selection of 
priority development areas depends on their rent seeking, instead of the criteria of 
development of the national economy and progress in general. Economic policy is 
less efficient in a highly corrupt environment (Jain, 2001).  
 
In a country with high corruption prevalence, the society strives towards drawing 
income from rent seeking instead of increasing the productivity. Public 
administration becomes impotent in discharging its functions and the state loses 
                                                 
5 Some theories in favour of corruption stress the function of corruption as “a greasing wheel” in the conditions 
of inefficient public administration (Leff, 1964). However, those benefits are surely less than adverse 
consequences of corruptive activity in disrupting market-based allocation of resources and income in the society. 
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its legitimate right to pass economic regulations and ensure a developmental 
institutional framework (Tanzi, 1998). Once all the institutions of the rule of law 
are derogated, the judicial system no longer ensures enforcement of contracts and 
protection of ownership rights. The number of public administration employees is 
increasing because of an attractive opportunity to make an additional earning 
from corruption activities on the one hand, and on the other, cumbersome and 
corrupt public administration is increasingly less efficient, thus closing the vicious 
circle of its size and poor functioning (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). Nepotism in 
employment additionally reduces the efficiency of the public administration since 
the competence of its employees declines. 
 
In general, inefficiency of institutions in a corrupt society hinders imports and 
application of new technologies, entry of capital, successful privatisation, labour 
mobility and increased productivity, as well as other economic performance factors 
(North, 1990). 
 
Given that corruption acts as an arbitrary tax, it increases the costs of entry and 
doing business, hampers competitiveness and increases uncertainty (business risk). 
Just as corruption affects more vulnerable parts of the population, small and newly 
established companies find it harder to bear the costs of corruption, and at the 
same time are more exposed to pressures of the growing bureaucracy (Kaufmann 
and Wei, 2000). On the contrary, large firms have at their disposal internal 
financial and human resources which resolve administrative problems, and are in a 
position to protect their own interest through corruption (Tanzi, 1998). 
   
The presence of corruption is related to lower private sector investments (Mauro, 
1995; Tanzi, 1998). It has a particularly adverse impact on foreign direct 
investments (Wei, 1999). Corruption is an impediment for the development of 
entrepreneurship and the economy in general. The World Bank (1997) declared 
corruption “the biggest obstacle for economic and social development”. Although 
this does not exhaust the discussion on adverse effects of corruption on economic 
and social development, in conclusion, the most important negative impacts of 
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Source: Author’s compilation, Lacko (2004). 
 
 
It is, therefore, not surprising that countries are trying to combat corruption with 
a number of anti-corruptive policy measures. However, before looking into the 
fight against corruption, the presence of corruption in Croatia will be discussed. 
 
 
3  Perceptions of Corruption in Croatia 
 
Since an analysis of corruption always starts from the perception of its prevalence, 
the incidence of corruption in Croatia will be reviewed from three different, 
mutually complementary aspects. The first one indicates the “external” perception 
of the level of corruption in our country and includes an analysis of the relative 
position of Croatia in relation to other countries. 
 
Another aspect is the public perception of Croatian citizens. Subjective perception 
of citizens is, to a large extent, a reflection of anti-corruption awareness and, when 
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interpreting the results of an analysis, one should always have in mind that the 
more corruption is highlighted as a problem in the media and the public, the 
higher are the perceptions of the corruption incidence. 
 
The third and possibly the least subjective assessment of corruption is the 
perception of entrepreneurs, who, in their daily business, are either exposed to 
corruption or they themselves resort to corruptive acts. 
 
 
3.1 Benchmarking of Croatia 
 
There is a relatively high perception of corruption prevalence in Croatia. 
According to one of the most widely used indicators, Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), annual CPI for Croatia and the pertaining 
place on the international ranking list clearly show negative trends of the level of 
corruption in Croatia (Table 1).  
 
Table 1  Corruption Perceptions Index for Croatia and International 
Ranking       1999-2005 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CPI score 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 
Croatia’s place on the international 
ranking list  
74 51 47 51 59 67 70 
Number of countries on the 
international ranking list  
99 90 91 102 133 146 159 
 
Note: Corruption Perceptions Index reflects the perceptions of the prevalence of corruption according to the opinion 
poll of businessmen and analysts. Higher index values imply a lower level of corruption, on the scale from 0 to 10. 
Source: Transparency International, www.transparency.org 
 
 
In the period between 2001 and 2005, the already low CPI score for Croatia 
declined from 3.9 to 3.4, marking an increase in the perceived presence of 
corruption. The nominal drop in Croatia’s position on the ranking list of the 
overall rated countries world-wide from the 47
th
 to the 70
th
 position was 
accompanied by Croatia’s lagging behind in comparison with less corrupt 
countries. Whereas in 2001, 52 percent of the total number of observed countries 
was ranked lower (lower CPI, i.e. higher perception of corruption), in 2005, 56 
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percent of countries were perceived as having a higher presence of corruption than 
Croatia. However, this change of Croatia’s rank is a result of the expansion of the 
list, which each year included new countries with a higher perception of the 
corruption. Negative trends of the assessment of the corruption prevalence in a 
specific country, particularly expressed in comparison with other countries, affect 
the credit rating of a country, the image investors have about risks and costs of 
investments, the stability of economic policy, and most of all the rule of law and 
the political system of a country. Publishing of international indicators enables a 
comparison with other countries and affects the perception on the observed 
country. However, in that case it is not the prevalence of corruption that is 
assessed subjectively, but the indices of corruption are taken as an objective 
indicator for economic decision-making. Therefore, it is particularly important to 
recognise the characteristics of the corruption prevalence in Croatia, from the 
point of view of the perception of the population and entrepreneurs on its 
incidence and impacts on the quality of life and doing business in Croatia.  
 
 
3.2 Croatian Public on Corruption  
 
Croatian citizens rate the level of the presence of corruption in Croatia as high, as 
confirmed by a survey of 1000 respondents that Transparency International 
Croatia conducted in May 2003 and 2005. In a period observed, the perception of 
corruption prevalence has increased. As much as one-fifth of the respondents 
believe that corruption in 2005 was much more present than two years before. The 
citizens consider the lack of strict sanctioning of corruption and the lack of 
political will and incompetence of the government to prevent corruption as the 
most responsible for such a situation.  
 
A large number of survey respondents believe that corruption is a particularly 
spread phenomenon in our country. While in 2003, 85.9 percent of respondents 
shared that opinion, in 2005 more than 89 percent of respondents considered 
corruption a spread and a wide-spread phenomenon. Higher perception of 
corruption was recorded with highly-educated population with higher income of 
households living in larger settlements. Regional perceptions of corruption 
indicated that between 2003 and 2005 a drop in the perceived level of corruption 
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was observed only in Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar, whereas at the same time 
the northern regions and Zagreb reached the highest level (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2  Perceptions of Regional Incidence of Corruption, 2003 and 2005 
 
 
Note: Counties in the system of regions are the following: Zagreb and the surroundings – the City of Zagreb, Zagreb 
County; Northern Croatia - Krapina-Zagorje, Varaždin, Međimurje, Koprivnica-Križevci, Bjelovar-Bilogora, 
Virovitica-Podravina Counties; Slavonia - Požega-Slavonia, Brod-Posavina, Osijek-Baranja, Vukovar-Srijem 
Counties; Lika, Kordun, Banovina - Sisak-Moslavina, Karlovac, Lika-Senj Counties; Istria, Primorje, Gorski 
Kotar-Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Istria County; Dalmatia - Zadar, Šibenik-Knin, Split-Dalmatia, Dubrovnik-Neretva 
Counties. 
Source: Transparency International Croatia www.transparency.hr, Corruption and Public Information, Opinions 
and Lessons Learned GfK - Centre for Market Research, survey, May 2003, May 2005. 
 
 
Ranked by the institutions in the public sector, corruption is the most present in 
the judiciary (80.7 percent of respondents) and health (79.7 percent). Those two 
sectors on the ranking list of the most corrupt institutions in 2005 surpassed the 
local government sector, which was rated as the area of the highest presence of 
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Table 2  Presence of Corruption in the Public Sector, in % of 
Respondents, 2003 and 2005 
Corruption is spread and wide spread  2003 2005 
Judiciary  70.0 80.7 
Health 71.3 79.7 
Local government; counties, municipalities, and cities  72.8 73.1 
Police 57.7 66.3 
Croatian Parliament  55.0 64.5 
Privatisation Fond 57.6 63.9 
Government 52.0 63.0 
Faculties 54.2 56.6 
Army 35.2 40.0 
Elementary and secondary schools 22.5 27.8 
Church 18.5 18.2 
 
Source: Transparency International Croatia www.transparency.hr, Corruption and Public Information, Attitudes, 
and Lessons Learned GfK-Centre for Market Research, Survey, May 2003, May 2005. 
 
 
In the public opinion, prevalent forms of corruption in Croatia are the 
“traditional” forms of corruption: nepotism, bribery and counter-favours (Figure 
3). Although rated as equally present forms, receiving valuable gifts irritates the 
public considerably less than receiving money. Public is also concerned about 
corruptive behaviour of officials who have additional paid functions (such as 
membership in boards etc.), given that this form of corruptive behaviour could be 
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Figure 3  The Forms of Corruptive Behaviour of Officials, 2005. 
 
 
Source: Transparency International Croatia www.transparency.hr, Corruption and Public Information, Attitudes, 
and Lessons Learned GfK-Centre for Market Research, Survey, May 2003, May 2005. 
 
 
3.3 Corruption as a Barrier for Doing Business  
 
Further analysis explore to which extent the business in Croatia is exposed to 
corruption by using the perceptions of corruption among the entrepreneurs of 
approximately one hundred small, medium and large enterprises in Croatia.
6
 
Original results - responses to the questions related to corruption
7
 from the survey 
questionnaire Executive Opinion Survey for the annual Global Competitiveness Report 
of the World Economic Forum conducted in 2002, 2003, and 2004 were used.  
 
                                                 
6 The number of surveyed enterprises: a total of 124 enterprises in 2002 (23 small enterprises with up to 100 
employees; 61 medium-sized enterprises with up to 500 employees; 40 large enterprises), a total of 109 
enterprises in 2003 (45 small enterprises; 42 medium-sized enterprises; 22 large enterprises), a total of 109 
enterprises in 2004 (63 small enterprises; 28 medium-sized enterprises; 18 large enterprises). 
7 The National Competitiveness Council provided the author with the original results of annual surveys 
related to the selected questions from standardized questionnaire which pertain to the perception of corruption 
in Croatian economy. The author would hereby like to thank for data provided for research purposes.  
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Like in the previous analysis of corruption persistence and trends perceived by 
Croatian citizens, businessmen also believe that the corruption prevalence is 
growing in comparison with the period three years ago. The corruption 
perceptions, in particular of political corruption, are very high. Approximately 80 
percent of entrepreneurs believe that the criteria in policy decision-making and 
awarding state contracts to specific companies are based on personal acquaintances 
with government officials. In this process small enterprises are most concerned 
with corruption in contracting of public investments and with the impact of 
corruption activities on laws and policy measures. One-half of the respondents rate 
as usual the distribution of public fund resources to enterprises or persons through 
corruption (Figure 4). Also, a high percentage of entrepreneurs (60 percent of 
respondents) assess that there is a link between financing of political parties 
through which one can obtain favourable policy measures in favour of donors. 
 




Note: Original responses to the question are assessments of a specific respondent to a provided scale from 1 to 7, with 
1 signifying the highest proneness / usual practice, while 7 signifies the highest neutrality of government officials/it 
never happens. The calculated share of respondents represents the responses rated 1, 2 and 3. The total share was 
calculated by weighting the share of small, medium and large enterprises in the total number of responses.  
Source of original data: Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic 
Forum and the University of Harvard  in Croatia, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
 
 
In 2004, enterprises in Croatia in their everyday business were exposed to or 
resorted to corruption mostly for the purpose of obtaining public investment 
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contracts (57 percent of respondents), to impact laws and policy in order to 
protect their business interests (46 percent), to obtain a favourable court decision 
(45 percent), and for the purpose of obtaining import and export licences (35 
percent). In other words, Croatian entrepreneurs make informal payments most 
frequently to officials and public administration to get unlawful protection of 
their business interests or pay the bribe to get around the norms of the rule of law 
(Figure 5). 
 
The assessed level of corruptive payments in the economy is up to 3 percent of the 
total annual income of an enterprise (25 percent of respondents), or between 4 and 
5 percent of total income (14 percent of respondents). The level of fee perceived as 
necessary to get public contracts is between 3 and 10 percent of the contract value; 
40 percent of enterprises believe that it is not necessary to pay a fee to secure 
obtaining a public contract (Table 3).  
 




Note: Original responses to the question are assessments of a specific respondent on the provided scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 signifying the response “constantly”, and the 7 response “never”. The calculated share of respondents represents 
the responses rated 1, 2 and 3. The total share was calculated by weighting the share of small, medium and large 
enterprises in the total number of responses.  
Source of original data: Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic 
Forum and the University of Harvard in Croatia, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
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Table 3  Perception of Corruption Payments of Entrepreneurs to Public 
Administration Employees, in % of Respondents, in 2004 
Payments of entrepreneurs required to ensure public contracts, in % of contracts 
Enterprise 0 Up to 3 % 4-5 % 6-10 % More than 10 % 
small 20 4.7 13 11.8 7 
medium-sized 13 13 0 1 0 
large 8.2 2.4 4.7 0 0 
Total 41.2 20.1 17.7 12.8 7 
Informal payments to public sector employees, in % of total income of entrepreneurs 
Enterprise 0 Up to 3 % 4-5 % 6-10 % More than 10 % 
small  33.3 14 9.7 1.1 0 
medium-sized  16.1 6.5 3.2 0 0 
large  10.8 4.3 1 0 0 
Total 60.2 24.8 14 1.1 0 
 
Source of original data: Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic 
Forum and the University of Harvard in Croatia, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
 
 
It is not surprising that small enterprises (up to 100 employees) believe that the 
percentage of the requested fee is higher and payment more frequent in 
comparison with large enterprises (more than 500 employees). Namely, large 
enterprises compete for large investment projects where the potential amount of 
informal payments account for a small share of contract value, while on the other 
hand small entrepreneurs in contracting small-scale projects have to offer a 
disproportionately high amount for concluding a deal. In addition, since smaller 
enterprises conclude public contracts to a relatively smaller extent, their responses 
reflect a subjective perception of a higher fee offered by other, larger enterprises. 
 
An analysis of corruption of Croatian entrepreneurs has indicated a corruption as 
a rising and very problematic barrier for doing business. In 2002, corruption 
ranked 11
th
 on the list of 14 obstacles for doing business, and in 2004 it went up 
to the high 4
th
 position. A group of large enterprises rank corruption the second 





                                                 
8 “Government instability” ranks the first among problematic factors for doing business as one of the offered 
answers. The assumption of the author is that in this ranking entrepreneurs were ranking the consistency of 
Government policy. 
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Table 4  Obstacles for Doing Business in Croatia, Ranked According to 
the Biggest Obstacles in 2004 
Ranking of Biggest Obstacles for Doing Business 
Obstacles   
2002 2003 2004 
Government instability 1 1 1 
Political instability 2 2 2 
Crime and theft 5 3 3 
Corruption 11 6 4 
Access to financing 6 7 5 
Tax regulations  9 4 6 
Inadequately skilled workers  8 10 7 
Poor labour ethics  3 5 8 
Foreign exchange regulations  10 11 9 
Tax rates 7 8 10 
Restrictive labour legislation   4 9 11 
Inadequate infrastructure 12 12 12 
Inflation 14 13 13 
Red tape  13 14 14 
 
Source of original data: Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic 
Forum and the University of Harvard in Croatia, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
 
 
In conclusion, there is a high and growing perception of corruption prevalence in 
Croatia. Both international organisations and citizens, as well as entrepreneurs in 
Croatia share that opinion. A more detailed analysis which exceeds the scope of 
this paper and includes demographic, socio-economic and other factors related to 
the perception of corruption prevalence (Budak, 2005) indicates that with the 
increase in the freedom of opinion and actualisation of corruption in the world, 
the awareness of the problem rises as well. Strengthening anti-corruption awareness 
is particularly marked in active, better educated, younger population, which by 
nature is more interested in life and work in a corruption-free environment 
(Lovrinčević et al., 2005). On the same note, an increase in the subjective 
perception of corruption prevalence may partially be a consequence of 
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4  Corruption and EU Accession 
 
The provision of the European Union Charter (1992) on Prevention and 
Combating Corruption is a basis for formulating the anti-corruption policy of the 
European Union. The basic determinants of that policy are specified in the 
Communication of the European Commission (2003). The listed priorities are 
strengthening political will in the fight against corruption, introducing the 
standards of functioning of public administration and public procurement, 
improving cooperation in the fight against corruption and harmonisation of laws 
of member states pursuant to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (adopted by the Council of Europe in 
1999). Concrete measures that followed pertain to the ban on acknowledging 
giving bribes as tax breaks, establishing the Group of States Against Corruption,
9
 
establishment of the European Anti-Fraud Office,
10
 etc. The guidelines of the anti-
corruption policy of the European Union towards accession countries, candidate 
countries and third countries are explicitly listed in an attachment to the 
Communication, namely: 
 
• Adoption and implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy 
and programme; 
• Ratification and implementation of international anti-corruption 
conventions; 
• Enactment of anti-corruption laws and their persistent enforcement; 
• Transparency in the work of public employees; application of merit 
criteria in employment, openness of the work of public services, a 
corresponding system of public sector salaries, rotation of employees in 
sensitive positions, income and assets declaration of public 
administration employees; 
• Establishment of the principle of accountability of public office and 
transparency in the work of all public services – the judiciary, police, 
customs office, tax administration, health, public procurement; 
                                                 
9 Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), established in May 1999. In December 2004 GRECO had 
37 member states of the Group. 
10 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), established in 1999. 
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• Setting up of the code of ethics in the public sector and control of its 
enforcement; 
• Legal protection of persons who report a suspicion of corruptive 
behaviour  (“whistleblowing”); 
• Strengthening social awareness on the harmfulness of corruption as a 
criminal offence; 
• Transparent financing of political parties; 
• Incentives in the private sector aimed at prevention of corruption. 
 
Implementation of those measures in the EU accession countries and candidate 
countries such as Croatia is monitored on two levels. The first mechanism is 
related to the member states of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). 
GRECO is a body of the European Union entrusted with the evaluation and 
monitoring of anti-corruption policy in member states, candidate countries and 
third countries.  Croatia has been its member since 2000. Each member submits 
reports to GRECO in the form of a structured questionnaire on the 
implementation of anti-corruption policy and is subject to an evaluation 
procedure implemented by the GRECO commission in a specific country. The 
objective of a permanent monitoring and evaluation implemented by GRECO is 
to provide assistance to member states of the Group and thereby provide assistance 
to in the implementation of anti-corruption policy.  
 
 
4.1 Anti-corruption Policy in Croatia 
 
Another form of anti-corruption policy of the European Union that is directly 
related to Croatia arises from the requirements of the European Union that 
countries have to fulfil in the accession process. This process started officially for 
Croatia in 2001, with the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. 
SAA specifies a) the obligation to cooperate in anti-corruption projects (Art. 4 and 
Art. 80) and b) the obligation to adopt the acquis communautaire, which includes 
enactment of legislation and establishment of institutions for the fight against 
corruption, as well as to adopt a national anti-corruption strategy. In the period 
that followed, Croatia formally fulfilled that part of political criteria for the 
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membership in the European Union. The national legislation for seizing 
corruption is in the criminal legislation, and fully harmonised with the ratified 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and the Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption of the Council of Europe (Official Gazette Nos. 11/00 and 06/03). 





• The definition of criminal offences has been expanded to include receiving 
and giving bribes in business operations as well. The bribery includes personal 
giving or promising of a gift or another benefit as reciprocal favours in 
concluding business deals or provision of services, as well as mediation in 
bribery.  
• Key amendments to the Criminal Act were also introduced for “influence 
peddling”. Illegal mediation is performed by a person who offers using of his 
or her position to another physical or legal person, but also the person asking 
for such a “favour” (passive unlawful mediation). 
• The definition of the term official person has been expanded to include 
official persons in foreign and /or international law. 
• Besides criminal sanctioning of corruption, preventive activity of combating 
corruption is also regulated by the law (prevention of money laundering, 
prevention of the conflict of interest).  
 
A number of existing and new legal regulations have contributed to the 
harmonisation of the Croatian legal framework with the European anti-corruption 
legislation.
12
 2001 also saw the establishment of the Office for Prevention of 
Corruption and Organised Crime (USKOK, Official Gazette Nos. 88/01, 12/02 
and 33/05) and the Economic Crime and Corruption Department of the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. 
                                                 
11 Responses of the Government of the Republic of Croatia to the Questionnaire of the European Commission, 
October 9, 2003, www.mei.hr 
12 The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia: “With the enactment of the package of anti-corruption 
acts, such as The USKOK Act, The Conflict of Interests Act, The Act on the Responsibility of Legal Persons for 
Criminal Offences, The Anti-money Laundering Act, The Witness Protection Act, The Act on Protection of 
Personal Data, and The Act on the Right to Access to Information, Croatia has so far made significant 
progress on the normative front in the convergence of Croatian legal solutions with the solutions of the 
international community”, December 2004. www.pravosudje.hr 
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Another part of the requirements of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
pertains to the enactment and implementation of the national anti-corruption 
strategy. The National Anti-corruption Program and the Anti-corruption Action 
Plan for Croatia were adopted in March 2002 (Official Gazette No. 34/02). The 
Action Plan provides for eight equally important priority areas: 
 
1. The rule of law and efficiency of the state based on the rule of law; 
2. Establishment of a special body for an efficient combat against 
corruption; 
3. Increasing the efficiency of criminal prosecution of corruption; 
4. Organisational measures in the system of governance; 
5. Decentralisation; 
6. Financial accountability measures and other economic measures; 
7. International activities; 
8. Encouraging political and civil responsibility. 
 
The action plan measures pertaining to the legislative and regulatory framework 
have been fulfilled, except for the establishment of the Committee of the 
Parliament of the Republic of Croatia for the implementation of the National 
Anti-corruption Program. However, there are big slippages in the implementation 
of the strategy, in USKOK’s operational activities, incomplete criminal statistics 
and low public awareness on the harmfulness of corruption. One of the 
outstanding questions is the non-transparent financing of political parties, which 
is not precisely enough and clearly regulated by the law
13
 and opens up the 
possibility for political corruption, where political influence is offered in return 
for financial support (Kregar et al., 2003). 
 
Insufficient implementation of the anti-corruption policy is also provided for by 
the documents of the competent bodies of the European Union related to the 
fulfilment of the political criteria for Croatia’s membership in the European 
                                                 
13 The Political Parties Act (Official Gazette Nos. 76/93, 11/96, 164/98 and 36/01); The Act on the Election 
of Representatives into the Croatian State Parliament (consolidated draft) (Official Gazette No. 69/03); The 
Act on the Election of the President of the Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette Nos. 22/92 and 71/97); The 
Act on the Financing of Election Promotion for the Election of the President of the Republic of Croatia, 
(Official Gazette No. 105/04). 
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Union.
14
 The list of short-term priorities in meeting the political criteria at 
granting to Croatia the status of a candidate country for membership in the 
European Union in May 2004 stated the following: “Improve the combat against 
corruption. Take steps to ensure that the legal framework for the combat against 
corruption is implemented. In particular, administrative and operational capacity 
of the Office for Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime (USKOK) 
should be strengthened. In addition, develop a National Strategy for Prevention of 
Corruption and Combating Corruption and ensure the necessary coordination of 
competent Government offices and bodies with regard to operational 
implementation. Introduce codes of behaviour/codes of ethics for employees and 
elected representatives. Undertake concrete actions aimed at raising awareness of 




Seizing corruption is one of six poignant issues that need to be resolved as part of 
the pre-accession strategy of Croatia as a candidate country under the future 
negotiations on the membership in the European Union.
16
 Progress in the 
fulfilment of that requirement is an important criterion for the membership in the 
European Union, as indicated by the reports on the candidate countries which can 
be realistically expected to become members of the European Union before 
Croatia. The latest reports on Bulgaria and Romania evaluate the efforts made so 
far in the fight against corruption, but they also state the need for an even more 
efficient implementation of the law. The importance of seizing corruption in the 
process of the accession to the European Union is also corroborated by an analysis 
of a sample of 25 transition countries according to the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI, 2004). The average Corruption Perceptions Index for transition 
countries in 2004 was 3.24 on the scale from 0 to 10, where higher values of the 
index indicate lower perception of the presence of corruption. Four groups of 
countries were formed from the sample according to the criterion of their status 
with regard to the European Union. The pertaining average corruption index for 
                                                 
14 The Opinion of the Application of the Republic of Croatia for the Membership in the European Union, 
Communication of the European Commission, Brussels, 20 April 2004. 
15 The Decision of the Council on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the European 
Partnership with Croatia, European Commission, Brussels, 20 April 2004. 
16 Strategic document of the European Commission on progress in the Enlargement Process, Communication 
of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 6 October 2004. 
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each group clearly indicates that the countries with lower corruption are more 
successful in the accession to the European Union and vice versa. Eight countries 
with the lowest corruption have recently become members of the European Union, 
whereas the countries with the highest corruption in the group “others”, i.e. 
countries not included in the accession process, are on the bottom of this list 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6  Corruption and Successfulness of the Accession to the European 
Union - Transition Countries, 2004 
 
 
Note: The Corruption Perceptions Index reflects the perception of corruption prevalence according to the opinion poll 
of businessmen and analysts. Higher values of the index indicate lower perceived level of corruption, with rankings 
on the scale from 0 to 10. New EU member states since May 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia). Candidate countries for membership in the EU (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania). Countries in the formal process of stabilisation and association with the EU (Albania, Macedonia). 
Other countries which are not in the process of association (the former Soviet republics except the Baltic states). 
Source: Transparency International, www.transparency.org 
 
 
The necessity of seizing corruption in Croatia arises from the assumed 
international mandates and international policy of the Republic of Croatia, as well 
as from strengthening the social awareness of the harmfulness of corruption. 
Disclosing and processing corruption is one of the indicators of the efficiency of 
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4.2 Disclosing and Processing Corruption in Croatia 
 
There is a large disproportion in disclosing and processing corruption and 
perception of the public on the high corruption prevalence in Croatia. Public 
awareness of prevalence and adverse consequences of corruption, in addition to 
incrimination of corruption, has a preventive effect in seizing corruption. The 
impacts of the anti-corruption policy are, on the one hand, evaluated by the rating 
of the perception of corruption prevalence, and on the other, by the number of 
disclosed and processed corruptive acts. The number of reported corruptive acts in 
the world and in Croatia is insignificant in relation to the presumed real extent of 
corruption (Kregar, 2003). However, an increase in the number of reported 
corruptive acts and a strict sanctioning are one of the basic characteristics of an 
efficient anti-corruption policy. 
 
In Croatian legislation, although there is a criminal culpability of acts related to 
corruption, there is no unified determination of corruption. In conventional 
terms, the term corruption in the national strategy, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Criminal Act (Official Gazette Nos. 110/97, 27/98, 129/00, 
51/01 and 105/04) implies receiving bribe (Art. 348) and giving bribe (Art. 347), 
illegal mediation (Art. 343), misuse of office of state authorities (Art. 338), abuse of 
office and authorities (Art. 337), disloyal competition in foreign-trade business 
operations (Art. 289), bankruptcy abuse (Art. 283), concluding harmful contracts 
(Art. 249), disclosing official secrets (Art. 351), revealing and unauthorised 
obtaining of official secrets (Art. 295). 
 
USKOK as a body competent for combating corruption has in its legal 
competence receiving and giving bribes, illegal mediation, abuse of office of state 
authorities, disloyal competition in foreign-trade business operations, bankruptcy 
abuse. Originally more narrow defined criminal offences in the competence of 
USKOK are explained by the fact that each criminal offence specified in the 
Strategy does not necessarily have to be a corruptive act (Bajić, 2003). Authorities 
of USKOK were also expanded by the expected amendments to the law in 2005. 
Criminal offences evidently related to corruption, introduced in the Criminal Act 
in July 2004 - namely, receiving bribes in business operations (Art. 294a) and 
giving bribes in business operations (Art. 294b), are also part of the Act on the 
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Ratification of the Convention of the United Nations against Corruption (Official 
Gazette No. 02/05). 
 
Besides the non-existence of an unambiguous definition on criminal offences that 
are considered to be corruption, available statistics per articles of the Criminal Act 
is not detailed enough. For the period between 1998 and 2003, act of the criminal 
offences that are defined in the National Anti-corruption Programme, the only 
available data are those for giving and receiving bribes and abuse of office and 
authorities (Criminal Act, Art. 347, 348 and 337). More detailed criminal statistics 
have been published for 2004, and it can be expected that in the forthcoming years 
statistical reporting will accompany the amendments to the Criminal Act in the 
segment of corruptive acts as well. For the consistency sake, analyses of criminal 
offences of corruption in the period from 1998 to 2004 were monitored only as 
criminal offences of giving and receiving bribes, and abuse of office and 
authorities. In that period, 6093 persons of age were charged with those criminal 
offences, of whom for 2185 (36 percent) charges were pressed, and 660 persons 
were sentenced (Table 5). 
 
In relation to the overall number of criminal offences in that period in Croatia, 
corruption-related criminal offences accounted for only 1.5 percent of reported 
cases, 1.1 percent of pressed charges and 0.6 percent of convictions. If the criminal 
offences of abuse of office and authorities, which represent corruption in a wider 
sense of the definition, are excluded from the analysis, the share of receiving and 
giving bribes in the overall number of criminal offences is very low. Besides the 
fact that those data indicate problems in disclosing corruption, the fact that a very 
low number of reported cases end up with sanctions is of even greater concern 
(Aralica and Budak, 2004). While one third of the total reported criminal offences 
end up in a sentence, the share of the sentenced persons for corruption offences 
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Figure 7  Criminal Offences of Corruption - the Number of Sentences against 
the Number of Reported Cases, 1998-2004 
 
 




Official data of the Central Bureau of Statistics were not elaborated for all articles 
of the Criminal Act pertaining to corruption, whereas occasional detailed reports 
of USKOK, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior differ by a larger number 
of reported criminal offences of corruption (Table 6).  
 
Table 6  Reported Corruption Offences since the Establishment of USKOK 
Criminal offence  
Art. of 
Criminal Act 2001 2002 2003 
Giving bribes 348 58 49 34 
Receiving bribes 347 50 89 65 
Abuse of office of government officials  338 1 4 5 
Illegal mediation  343 5 2 4 
Total   114 144 115 
 
Source: for 2001: National Anti-corruption Programme and Acton Plan, OG 34/02; for 2002: Bajić, M. 
“Koruptivna kaznena djela”, in Kregar, J., D. Palijaš (ed.), National Program for Combating Corruption, 
Ministry of Justice, Administration and Local Self-government and Transparency International Croatia, Zagreb, 




In official statistical data from Table 5 the total number of offences of giving 
bribes is higher than the number of receiving bribes, which can be explained as 
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one person receiving bribes from a number of givers.
17
 However, since the 
foundation of USKOK, according to internal records, the number of reported 
cases of receiving bribes is growing in comparison with giving bribes. It represents 
a possible positive progress in raising awareness of citizens and proactive anti-
corruption campaign (opening hotlines for reporting corruption, activities of non-
governmental organisations such as Transparency International Croatia, etc.). With 
the announced reorganisation and enhancing the authorities of USKOK in the 
forthcoming period it is possible to expect a larger number of reported corruption 
cases, and the judiciary reform would contribute to a more efficient processing of 
filed charges. Since the legal aspect of the combat against corruption is not a 
subject of this study, it should only be noted that empirical research for the USA 
have established a positive correlation between the number of sentences for 
corruptive acts and expenditures for functioning of institutions entrusted with law 
enforcement and higher salaries of public administration employees (Goel and 
Nelson, 1998). Also, stricter sanctions for corruption offences have yielded 
excellent results in combating corruption in some countries, such as Hong-Kong 
(Kregar, 1999). 
 
5 Policy Recommendations for Anti-corruption in 
Croatia 
 
Corruption in Croatia is a systematic phenomenon with a stronghold in all 
structures of the society. Bribing of public service employees, nepotism in 
employment and awarding positions by which appointed persons are in conflict of 
interest are common in public life in Croatia. Freedom of thought and of 
expression has enabled a more open disclosure of information on corruption 
prevalence through the media, however, it seems that an endemic characteristic of 
corruption has demoralised civil society so much that anti-corruption awareness is 
at a very low level. This has resulted in conciliatoriness of the public and the 
common view that it is almost impossible to reduce corruption in Croatia. 
Therefore, it is not easy to answer what measures of the anti-corruption policy 
should be used to reach the core of the corruption problem. 
                                                 
17 This interpretation surely does not exhaust all reasons for the described departure. More detailed 
interpretations by reviewing the content of a filed charge and court case files exceed the scope of this paper. 
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Normative measures of combating corruption have not yielded expected results. 
The deficiencies of the created normative framework and its non-compliance 
enable getting around regulations and opening up of the opportunity for 
corruption. In relation to this, an important initiative for the drafting of a new 
law on financing political parties and election campaigns was instigated in 2005 by 
Transparency International Croatia. However, the normative framework for the 
struggle against corruption does exist, and the inefficiency of the anti-corruption 
policy cannot be attributed to a deficiency of the law, but to the fact that the anti-
corruption measures are not implemented. The implementation of anti-corruption 
policy requires primarily a political will and commitment in the implementation 
of measures that are already contained in legal regulations. At the same time, the 
normative legal and institutional framework should be improved. This is far 
simpler a task provided there is political will.  
 
Political will is a prerequisite for combating corruption and building confidence in 
the ruling structures and public administration. Political will, however, arises from 
the ratio, in economic terms, of costs and benefits, i.e. expected political losses and 
gains of the government from the implementation of appropriate policy measures, 
including the anti-corruption measures. A lack of political will is most obvious in 
the lack of concrete decisive actions of criminal prosecution of perpetrators of 
corruptive acts, by which it is possible in a relatively short term to initiate a change 
of the positive public awareness on the disadvantage of corruption and restore the 
confidence in institutions.  
 
The system of disclosing, processing and punishing of corruptive acts will only be 
efficient in the conditions of a prevailing rule of law and efficient state based on 
the rule of law. The judiciary reform is an integral part of establishing the rule of 
law, which implies adoption of codes of ethics in the judiciary and legal 
profession, education of employees and technological equipment of the judicial 
system. The internal control systems, protection of “whistleblowers” who report 
corruption, training and motivation of the police is another one in the set of 
measures targeting greater efficiency of criminal prosecution of corruption. 
Furthermore, statistical reporting on the disclosure and processing of corruption 
offences should be improved. 
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A group of measures pertaining to civic responsibility is the introduction and 
strict adherence to the ban of the conflict of interest, encouraging the work of civil 
society organisations and freedom of the press, promoting anti-corruption 
awareness through education, religious education and other civil society 
institutions. Particularly important measure of combating corruption is the 
prevention of the conflict of interest. Although there is an explicit legal ban of the 
conflict of interest in Croatia, it is treated as an incidental obligation of an 
official. The conflict of interest frequently does not cease with a formal resignation 
from a function, because informal connections remain very tight, or vacant 
functions are only delegated to other close persons. Nepotism is an omnipresent 
pattern of getting around the civil society norms in Croatia.  
 
In this respect, the proposal of a new National Anti-corruption Programme 2006-
2008
18
 refers to a number of concrete measures of fighting corruption with an 
action plan, as well as their proponents. In the area of politics and public 
administration, the measures pertain to regulating the financing of political 
parties, prevention of the conflict of interest, objectivising of criteria in 
employment, enabling access to information and democratic takeover of power. 
Thorough reforms of the health and judiciary systems are considered an efficient 
way to remove the source of corruption in those sectors, although only in the long 
term. Control of the work of local government and direct elections for local self-
government bodies have been rated, with a general strengthening of the 
transparency of work of local self-government and the decentralisation process, as 
key measures of the prevention of corruption at the local level. A novelty in 
relation to the 2002 National Anti-corruption Programme is also an explicit listing 
of measures for combating corruption in the economy. The measures are related to 
encouraging the freedom of market competition and accelerated privatisation to 
disable an arbitrary influence of the state on economic subjects and market 
competition. The proposal of the National Programme also provides for a special 
range of oversight measures and increased transparency in public procurement 
procedures. 
 
                                                 
18 At the moment of the completion of this paper, the proposal of the new Anti-corruption Strategy was 
presented to the public on 28 October 2005, before being sent to the parliamentary debate. www.pravosudje.hr. 
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In addition to the described preventive anti-corruption measures, the proposal of 
the National Programme advocates a reorganisation and operational support to 
the bodies entrusted with revealing corruption, and for repressive action in 
criminal prosecuting of corruption. Continual measures of cooperation with 
international anti-corruption institutions and a public awareness campaign on 
adverse consequences of corruption make up special chapters of the proposal of 
the National Anti-corruption Programme. 
 
In Croatia, no doubt, there exists a civic and political awareness of the problem of 
corruption. However, it remains to be assessed to which extent perseverance in the 
implementation and political will for combating corruption will yield results in 
the forthcoming period. 
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